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Abstract—Social media trolling is a powerful tactic to manipu-
late public opinion on issues with a high moral component. Troll
farms, as evidenced in the past, created fabricated content to
provoke or silence people to share their opinion on social media
during the US presidential election in 2016. In this paper, we
introduce an alternate way of provoking or silencing social media
discourse by manipulating how users perceive authentic content.
This manipulation is performed by man-in-the-middle malware
that covertly rearranges the linguistic content of an authentic
social media post and comments. We call this attack Malware-
Induced Misperception (MIM) because the goal is to socially
engineer spiral-of-silence conditions on social media by inducing
perception. We conducted experimental tests in controlled set-
tings (N = 311) where a malware covertly altered selected words
in a Facebook post about the freedom of political expression on
college campuses. The empirical results (1) confirm the previous
findings about the presence of the spiral-of-silence effect on social
media; and (2) demonstrate that inducing misperception is an
effective tactic to silence or provoke targeted users on Facebook
to express their opinion on a polarizing political issue.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social medial trolling became widely known phenomenon,
reaching organized dimension in 28 countries by 2017 [11].
Trolling refers to users who respond to social media posts
with fabricated and often inflammatory posts and comments
to get a rise out of users [22]. Organized trolling campaigns
usually target specific populations, attempting to sway the
opinion of entire groups, for example, domestic voters. Over
time, the coordinated ”nudging” of public opinion has become
systematized, from military units that experiment with psy-
chological operations to strategic communication firms that
take contracts from governments for social media campaigns
aiming to induce misperception [7].
A malicious actor interested in trolling seeks to ”nudge”
opinions on polarizing or controversial issues discussed via
social media, e.g. election campaigns, climate change, vacci-
nation, immigration policy, reproductive health and freedom
of political expression. An overt strategy is to do what the
Russian trolling army did in 2016: manufacture a large number
of political trolling posts to rile up Americans [57], [11]. This
is an arduous task as it requires many people and resources
in order to be successful (i.e. a bot network and a lot of
fabricated content) [41]. There is also a risk that the social
media administrators will remove any suspicious posts [1].
The malicious actors will likely continue to search for covert
alternatives to manipulate public opinion through social media
in a more targeted fashion. One alternative is to still use
fabricated content and induce ”information gerrymandering”
[54]. This still requires a large network of people who need to
create and strategically infuse posts and comments on social
media. A more economic alternative is a malware that acts
as a man-in-the-middle in exchanging online information and
manipulates how authentic content is perceived by targeted
individual. The advantage of the malware is that it is platform-
agnostic (i.e. can work on Facebook, Twitter, or Reddit) and
can be strategically packaged as a web browser extension or
a third-party social media application for smartphones.
Studies on manipulating online information point that in-
duced misperceptions represent an effort of a malicious actor
to ”lead an individual towards making false or implausible
interpretations of a set of true facts” [5]. In the same manner,
this malware covertly swaps, rearranges, or removes words
presented to an individual to induce interpretation of a set
of true facts to the objective of a malicious actor. Using a
malware to induce misperception, to our knowledge, is a zero-
day social engineering attack because it allows the targeted
individual to verify the authenticity of online information thus
bypassing all conventional cues people use to detect ”phishy”
or fabricated content [14]. Like phishing, the malware also
employs the psychological principles of persuasion to obtain
individuals’ assets (e.g. system permissions) but not to damage
the local files or exfiltrate data [9]. Instead, the goal is to
use the system permissions to covertly manipulate textual
data in transit and induce interpretation of legitimate content
biased towards the objective of the malicious actor, e.g. poach
disgruntled workers or bias voters [60].
This paper introduces the concept of malware-induced
misperception and reports a test of the attack on polarized
discourse on Facebook. The goal was to investigate whether
this malware can be used to engineer or disrupt the spiral-of-
silence effect on social media, that is, to manipulate how users
perceive an authentic Facebook post and comments instead
of using any fake information or inflammatory content. The
spiral-of-silence theory argues that individuals fear becoming
socially isolated, and as a consequence, they constantly mon-
itor the public opinion climate on mass media to determine
whether the majority shares their own opinions or not [40].
If the individuals perceive that their own opinion is in the
minority, they end up silencing themselves, especially when
discussing polarizing or controversial issues. The theory, origi-
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nally developed for face-to-face interpersonal communication,
is also applicable in social media settings [34].
A sample of 311 participants was randomly assigned to a
control and treatment group. The participants in the control
group were exposed to a legitimate Facebook post and com-
ments in a web browser while the participants in the treatment
group saw a malware-manipulated version of the same Face-
book post and comments. The discourse was on the polarizing
issue of freedom of speech on college campuses [4], [42].
The malware was packaged as a web browser extension as a
low-cost option that allowed controlled use only in laboratory
settings (alternative packaging is also discussed in the paper)
[39]. The results show that the malware could successfully
engineer the spiral-of-silence effect for individuals on the
far ends of the political spectrum. The results are in line
with the previous findings that people with divergent opinions
”use Facebook as a forum to monitor the prevailing public
opinion on important polarizing issues without expressing
their own comments [16], [30]. In the reminder of the paper,
Section 2 elaborates the social engineering background of the
MIM attack. Section 3 discusses the spiral-of-silence theory
underpinning the MIM attacker’s social engineering strategy
when applied to polarizing discourse on Facebook. Section 4
covers the study design and Section 5 presents the empirical
results. Section 6 discusses the implications of materializing
malware-induced misperceptions beyond social media and
ways to counter these attacks. Section 7 concludes the paper.
II. MALWARE-INDUCED MISPERCEPTION
A. Concept
Conventional social engineering attacks target individuals’
assets, e.g. passwords or system privileges. These assets
enable social engineers to obtain unauthorized access so as to
damage or exfiltrate confidential data. For this purpose social
engineers usually write various types of malware (e.g. adware,
trojans, keyloggers, rootkits, etc.). The most common vector
for malware delivery and installation is through ”phishing”,
i.e. an email or a text where the social engineers employ
various principles of persuasion to secretly obtain the target
individual’s compliance to run the malware code on their
machine [14]. The phishing campaigns can be massive and
target the largest number of individuals possible or they can
target specific and well-researched individual(s) [23]. Social
engineering attacks are notoriously successful and abundant
effort is invested in detecting suspicious content as well as
training individuals to spot both massive and targeted or
”spear” phishing emails [2], [27].
Because phishing attacks are low-cost/high-reward, social
engineers have the possibility to try different persuasion routes
and choose how to utilize the target individual’s assets. In
this paper we introduce a social engineering attack utilizing a
malware that targets the integrity but not the confidentiality
of the target individual’s data. The attack is executed in
two stages. First, like in conventional phishing, the target
individual is persuaded to install a seemingly benign software
plug-in, that is, yield their system privileges for manipulating
textual data. Second, these privileges are used to covertly
manipulate the linguistic content of the online communication
the target individual exchanges through a browser or an email
client. The goal of this covert manipulation, by contrast to
conventional phishing, is to induce misperception about an
event, news report, a communicating party, or a communi-
cation context [5]. Such an attack, to our knowledge, has
not yet surfaced in the cyber realm. We therefore named it
a Malware-Induced Misperception (MIM) attack. The covert
linguistic manipulation of online communication is specific to
a target individual (e.g. linguistic style, pragmatics, cultural
norms, etc.), therefore, the MIM attack is more feasible in
a spear phishing form. The attack is low-cost in that the
malware could be packaged either as a browser extension, an
email client ”add-in” (e.g. Outlook), or perhaps in the future
an entirely new application. The high-reward of the attack,
if successful, is the opportunity to distort the target’s mental
picture or map of reality to establish psychological domination.
Distorting individual’s map of reality by inducing misper-
ception has become a significant problem on social media
over the past few years. Malicious actors like trolls, sock
puppets, and alternative media flooded Facebook and Twitter
prior to the US presidential election with rumors, fake news,
and inflammatory comments with the objective to bias people
and sway their votes [53]. After these efforts were shored
by Facebook and Twitter, malicious actors proceeded with a
strategic infusion of fabricated content for particular events
and towards well-researched individuals in a tactic called
”information gerrymandering” [54]. The idea is to manufacture
echo chambers to create a (mis)perception that ”most of the
others were going to for the other party (an improved version
of Cambridge Analytica’s strategy targeting voters in sway
districts [20]). In all of these cases, the malicious actors relied
on a considerable number of people who fabricated these posts
or relentlessly posted inflammatory comments on social media.
The MIM attack is inspired by these misperception cam-
paigns but takes advantage of the social engineering tactics.
The malware replaces the need for constantly fabricating
content or infusing inflammatory social media posts and com-
ments. The malware also elevates worries that the social media
platform can detect a misperception campaign. Instead, the
misperception takes place on a local machine or smartphone
where the malware covertly rearranges the words and the
”tone” of an authentic social media post while the targeted
individual is reading it in real time. Studies on manipulating
online information point that induced misperceptions represent
an effort of a malicious actor to ”lead an individual towards
making false or implausible interpretations of a set of true
facts” [5]. By targeting authentic content, the malware allows
the targeted individual to verify the facts and the credibility
of a source thus bypassing all conventional cues people use
to detect ”phishy” content [14]. The goal of the malware is to
covertly manipulate the data in transit and induce interpreta-
tion of authentic content biased towards the objective of the
malicious actor, e.g. bias voters, poach a high-profile target,
or introduce fear, doubt, and uncertainty.
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B. Implementation
This malware can be packaged as a browser extension, an
email client ”add-in” (e.g. Outlook), or an entirely new appli-
cation. The malware usually is disguised as seemingly benign
(e.g an extension for accessibility support, Outlook add-in
for managing email threads, or a lightweight, power-saving
mobile app). This packaging/disguise is preferred because the
malware requires text manipulation permissions that later will
be leveraged for the MIM attack [59]. Developing extensions,
add-ins, and apps is free and a benign software can pass all
the security checks before publishing [39]. For example, a
browser extension variant of the malware can disguise the
misperception-inducing logic and pass the security checks by
posing as an ”accessibility (a11y) extension” that claims the
rewording is done to help non-native English speakers make
sense of English slang on social media [26]. An email add-in
variant of the malware can pass the security checks, similarly,
on the grounds of grouping and classifying social media email
reports for better management through an Outlook client [58].
Certainly, the malware could be packaged as a third-party
smartphone app that, for example, claims to reduce the battery
usage by summarizing the content of social media posts [50].
The coordinated effort to sway people’s opinions about
polarizing issues on social media makes a compelling case
for the MIM attack to be implemented either as a browser
extension or a third-party social media app. For the purpose of
our study we developed the malware as a browser extension
in JavaScript as a more economic proof-of-concept variant.
The goal was to investigate whether the malware can induce
the spiral-of-silence effect on social media, that is, influence
a target individual to divulge a comment or personal opinion
on social media that they otherwise wouldn’t post, fearing
social isolation. We conducted a pilot study with 15 volunteer
participants where we tested the malware’s potential to induce
misperception on a simple Facebook post. All participants
were 18 years or older, regularly read and commented on Face-
book posts through a web browser, and had prior knowledge
of social engineering, phishing, and past social media trolling,
misperception, and fake news campaigns.
The preliminary question was to gauge whether participants
are open to using browser extensions for standard utilities,
for example an add-blocker or a sticky notes extension like
”Stickies” [59]. Most of them responded they already do use
various extensions that improve their productivity and install
them almost immediately after downloading or start using a
web browser on their computers. Some of the participants
were aware that browser extensions could potentially contain
spyware and affect their privacy or steal personal information
like remembered passwords or credit cards, and they look for
legitimate extensions only on the browser application stores.
Some of them were aware of extensions that manipulate
content, like the Facebook demetricator, that hides the number
of likes on Facebook posts to enable a more immersive
interaction with the social media platform [21]. None of them
were aware of browser extensions that covertly rearrange text
before it is rendered in a browser. This was an important
feedback suggesting that it is plausible for a malicious actor
to employ a legitimacy-by-design (seeming legitimate both in
visual design and in what the user expects to see from a
legitimate application) to persuade the target user to install
a benign extension in the first place [39].
The pilot participants first encountered an authentic Face-
book post, shown in Figure 1, and reported that they are not
inclined to comment on it, explaining that the post fits the
campaign narrative of Mr. Sanders for the forthcoming US
elections in 2020. The malware then was used to covertly
swap the position of the words ”Commander” and ”Organizer,”
as shown in Figure 2, to induce misperception that Mr.
Sanders is shifting his campaign strategy from peaceful to
militaristic [48]. Noticing that the accent of the post is on
the ”Commander in Chief” instead of ”Organizer in Chief,”
the participants felt compelled to express concerns about Mr.
Sanders’ true intentions as a potentially future president and
ask questions about this shift through comments.
Fig. 1. MIM extension ”off”
Fig. 2. MIM extension ”on”
An important feature of the malware is that it allowed the
participants, trained in spotting ”phishy” and inflammatory
content, to verify the post (i.e. this is a valid campaign message
by Senator Sanders) and verify the credibility of the sender
(this is the official Facebook page of Senator Sanders [46]).
The MIM attack in the pilot study successfully disrupted
the spiral-of-silence effect by inducing misperception of the
next steps of Senator Sanders’s presidential campaign. This
motivated us to test the potential of the MIM attack to socially
engineer similar effects with a larger sample of participants
on similar, but rather implicit, polarizing political discourse
on Facebook.
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C. Threat Model
The MIM advantage, from the perspective of an attacker,
is that the relationship between the target user and a web re-
source, or another person, can be manipulated without alerting
any of the involved parties. The malware can be employed, for
example, to influence a target user to divulge a comment or
personal opinion on social media that they otherwise wouldn’t
post, fearing social isolation. MIM can be categorized as
a threat where an adversarial group or nation-state (threat
source) conducts externally-based electronic communication
modification i.e. man-in-the-middle attacks. MIM is a complex
and micro-targeted attack and it requires a sophisticated level
of expertise and well-resourced adversary [25]. The intent
for launching a MIM attack can be a low-intensity trolling
campaign, provoking (or silencing) comments on social media
for posts with a strong moral component. A target for MIM can
be any public person like a political party leader, a celebrity,
or a social media influencer, but MIM can equally target
disgruntled employees, a spouse, or friends. The predisposing
conditions for a successful MIM attack are: (1) a targeted
user to install a software that can be dynamically modified
to manipulate text (a web browser extension in our case); (2)
the targeted user accesses social media regularly, Facebook in
particular; and (3) the targeted user is interested in polarizing
issues extensively discussed on social media.
D. Linguistic Manipulation Strategies
The malware works on a string array of ”valence words”
and word replacement logic if a target word is detected on
Facebook page. The malware parses the HTML document
with a findMatch() function to detect a potential word
match. If a match is detected, findMatch() returns the
opposite valenced/target array word of the source word. A
textSwap() function then replaces the occurrences of the
initially detected word based on a configurable logic (all
occurrences, only the first occurrence, or only if the occurrence
is in the comments section of a Facebook page). This is the
simplest, low-cost low-complexity version of the malware. A
MIM attacker can implement more complex logic where the
linguistic manipulation can take place only in certain parts of
the Facebook content or only in Facebook posts reporting on
a specific person or issue, for example, only campaign posts
by Senator Sanders but not the other presidential candidates.
The string array of ”valence words” need not to be predefined
in that an attacker could use natural language processing to
analyze authentic Facebook content and adapt the linguistic
rearrangement that makes the most sense in the context of
target individuals’ Facebook diet [redacted]. Using a Markov
chain a model can be trained to choose replacement words
based on an identified corpus of Facebook content. This natural
language processing strategy was previously used by other
researchers to generate a series of quotes that sound like
President Trumps State of the Union [12].
E. Social Media Vector
The MIM attack differentiates itself from targeted ad cam-
paigns on social media like the ones produced by Cambridge
Analytica or requested by the UK Labour Party leaders to save
on campaign costs and target only the party leader Jeremy
Corbyn’s Facebook account [3], [20]. The attack is distinct
from ”information gerrymandering” where content is infused
strategically in a social network to exploit the ”homophily” -
people’s natural tendency to surround themselves with others
who share their perspectives and opinions about the world
(the ”echo chambers” effect) [18]. While the aforementioned
tactics aim to manipulate the perception of social media
content, MIM doesn’t require access to external user data nor
uses ads or fabricated comments aimed to reinforce an echo
chamber. Instead, MIM works directly on the social media
post exploiting the main attention of a targeted user. This is
beneficial to for micro-targeting individuals without worrying
that the social media platform might detect the attack.
As with the early period of political trolling, fake news,
and alternative media, this creates a situation where people
are left to resist and reject suspicious content by themselves.
However, the malware could plausibly evade this detection
because it preserves factual structure of the social media
content. Even if someone is aware and carefully looking for
inflammatory content or fake news the attack removes the
grounds for such suspicion by working on authentic content
[51]. In other words, the attack covertly ”nudges” a targeted
individual to make interpretations of a set of true facts to
the objective of the malicious actor [5]. The MIM attack
has the potential to be used for a purpose of trolling and
spreading rumors, if the targeted words are aggression or
produce misinformation. Nonetheless, the malware’s primary
goal of inducing misperception is the focus of the study.
III. SPIRAL-OF-SILENCE
A. Theoretical Background
Spiral-of-silence theory, developed by Noelle-Neumann, ar-
gues that people use their media environment as a barometer
for the prevailing climate of opinion on controversial issues
[40]. Printed newspapers and TV, and now the Internet and
social media, operate as a social monitor by alerting the public
about the perceived appropriateness of publicly expressing cer-
tain opinions. This is the case because society threatens with
isolation those individuals who violate the societal consensus
on values and goals. This consensus, expressed through the
majority opinion in the media, influences how people form
their individual opinion and action. Individuals whose opinions
do not coincide with the majority opinion, as they perceive it,
tend to silence their opinions, fearing social isolation [49].
This silence effect results from one’s perceptions of public
opinion climates and susceptibility to social pressure.
Numerous public opinion studies have applied spiral-of-
silence theory to empirical examination [49], [32], [34]. The
primary dependent variable for the predisposing spiral-of-
silence conditions in most of them is the willingness to
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express one’s opinion. As the original theory posits, human
behavior, particularly the willingness to express one’s opin-
ion, is heavily directed by a fear of isolation that makes
sanctions of denial of sympathy, and so forth, very powerful
forms of influence. However, this significant variation in these
predisposing conditions and thus the effects of the spiral-
of-silence prompted a redefinition towards capturing one’s
willingness to self-censor, defined as ”the withholding of one’s
true opinion from an audience perceived to disagree with that
opinion” [24]. In a social discourse, individuals can’t simply
stay silent, but instead look for a way to avoid expressing
their opinion through some other methods. The self-censorship
predisposing conditions are expressed through four opinion
expression strategies individuals resort to when discussing
issues with high moral component: (1) comment on the issue;
(2) read or listen about the issue but choose not to comment;
(3) ignore it; (4) tell someone else about it offline.
B. Spiral-of-Silence on Social Media
The spiral-of-silence theory was developed for face-to-
face communication and considers printed and televised mass
media content. The Internet has changed the way people com-
municate and receive mass media - it provides anonymity and
at the same time affords individuals access to diverse media
content, autonomy, selectivity, and social media interactivity
[17]. The fundamental change in interpersonal communication
and media exposure prompted researchers to test the spiral-
of-silence theory in the context of social media. Since social
media interactions are anchored in real-world relationships,
social media interactions are still vulnerable to fears of social
isolation. Individuals online may express their opinions in
ways that may ”result in appearing unpopular or otherwise
socially undesirable within the social media community” [37].
Our research builds upon existing studies that point to the
validity of the spiral-of-silence effect on social media. A
study examining how social media is used to express opinions
on the issue of LGBT+ tolerance found that the spiral-of-
silence phenomenon is present on Facebook [16]. Testing how
perceptions of surveillance contribute to an online spiral-of-
silence in the wake of the Edward Snowden’s revelations,
authors in [55] found that the government’s online surveillance
programs may threaten the disclosure of minority views and
contribute to the reinforcement of majority opinion. A study of
discussion on nuclear power generation showed that the spiral-
of-silence phenomenon exists on Twitter, too. Confirming
the tenability of this theory in a social media context, a
meta-analysis of the spiral-of-silence demonstrated that the
relationship between opinion climate perception and opinion
expression is as equally strong and robust on social media as
it is in face-to-face communication [34].
C. Spiral-of-Silence in Social Media on Political Issues
People are regularly exposed to political content on social
media. A Pew research report indicates that users on social
media are more exposed to political perspectives dissimilar
from their own than in face-to-face encounters [45]. Disagree-
ments between users on social media on political topics is very
common. For example, 73% of the surveyed users reported
having friends with divergent political opinions. This is in line
with the notion that high levels of sociality diversifies political
discourse on social media platforms [8].
Suspecting that social media platforms may facilitate the
spiral-of-silence phenomenon on political issues, authors in
[16] revealed that ”encountering agreeable political content
predicts speaking out, while encountering disagreeable post-
ings stifles opinion expression.” Authors in [30] found that the
fear of isolation from offline contacts increases the willingness
to self-censor when it comes to posting political comments
on Facebook. A recent study further confirmed the opinion
congruence-based mechanism argued by the spiral-of-silence
theory when expressing political opinions on Facebook [33].
Authors in [15] confirmed these findings when it comes
to commenting on police discrimination on Facebook. Most
recently, authors in [29] assessed the spiral-of-silence in the
context of the 2016 US presidential election. Their analysis
suggests that the more people perceived a public opinion sup-
port for Hillary Clinton, the less likely were to share a diver-
gent pinion. This same phenomenon was particularly present
for Donald Trump on Facebook. Because Donald Trump was
highly unfavorable among Facebook users therefore inducing a
spiral-of-silence among those who might have supported him
in reality. These studies suggest the spiral-of-silence occurs
when Facebook users discuss polarizing political issues.
IV. SOCIALLY ENGINEERING A SPIRAL-OF-SILENCE ON
FACEBOOK
A. Overview
The spiral-of-silence theory posits that humans fear isola-
tion, which motivates us to observe our social environment
and mass media to determine opinion climate on issues with
a strong moral component. The results of this observation
influences our opinion expression in public, both interperson-
ally and on social media. The studies testing the the spiral-
of-silence tenability assume that the public opinion climate
is assessed from legitimate sources of information. What if
this assumption is violated? The Cambridge Analytica incident
provides reasonable grounds for us to believe that a malicious
actor might resort to manipulating how one derives the public
opinion climate about a polarizing political issue, for example,
a presidential election or a referendum to leave the EU.
One option is by trolling, a tactic where a malicious actor
affects the public opinion climate by posting provoking and
inflammatory messages and/or comments. Although effective
in the past, social media platforms nowadays are taking
active measures to curb trolling and remove suspicious user
accounts and content. Another option for a malicious actor is
to use MIM to covertly manipulate the public opinion climate
for targeted set of social media users. Instead of infusing
inflammatory content, the idea is to make a authentic posts
and comments look ”polarized.” The MIM browser extension
described above can be used for this purpose and alter valenced
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words in the comments section before it is presented in the
targeted user’s browser. The goal is to ”socially engineer”
the spiral-of-silence effect. In other words, the malware either
induces or eliminates the fear of isolation and with that makes
a target user more or less willing to self-censor their opinion.
This motivated us to investigate whether an MIM attack will
affect one’s perception on the public opinion climate.
B. Research Questions and Hypotheses
The study utilized a social media post about freedom of po-
litical expression on college campuses. This topic was chosen
following President Donald Trump’s executive order to protect
freedom of speech on college campuses [56]. Expressing
political opinions on college campuses is a polarizing issue and
has generated substantial media coverage and induced heated
discussion both in-person and online [4], [42]. We opted out
for this polarizing topic in the Facebook post to eliminate any
a priori bias about a trending topic that a participant might
have seen before. Another objective was to capture the initial
reaction of the participants to a ”new” post that was based on
real, authentic events. The study also focused on one Facebook
post with a limited number of comments instead of multiple
posts to mimic a realistic setting where users qucikly skim a
piece of online text, e.g. a ”new” Facebook post [13].
The original scenario, shown in Figure 3, included an
authentic Facebook post about a report on political bully-
ing at a higher education institution followed by authentic
conservative-leaning comments. The comments were from
users with generic aliases and removed profile pictures to
eliminate any potential bias on the grounds of popular trolling
accounts. We used the malware to manipulate the comments
and make them appear liberal-leaning in the MIM scenario
shown in Figure 4. The malware replaced the words ”liberal”
with ”conservative,” ”far-left” with ”far-right,” ”over-parented”
with ”under-parented,” ”more” with ”less,” ”far-left” with ”far-
right”, and ”Trump” with ”Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez” (we
took a surface polar opposite approach following the reports
of both President Trump and congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez
blocking users from their social media accounts [36], [47]).
Participants were randomly assigned in a control group
(original scenario) and treatment group (MIM scenario). The
collected data were used to investigate the possibility to
”socially engineer” the spiral-of-silence effect for Facebook
users. Because the four response strategies proposed in [24]
indicate the predisposing spiral-of-silence conditions on social
media, we used them as a primary dependent variable to
explore whether the malware, by inducing misperceptions,
can covertly nudge people to choose a particular one:
Research Question 1: How the manipulated Facebook post
on the freedom of political expression on college campuses
influences the utilization of different response strategies as
predisposing spiral-of-silence conditions?
To test the existence of the spiral-of-silence effect on
Facebook, based on the predisposing conditions and using
the well-established willingness to self-censor measure [16],
[33], we proposed the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The willingness to self-censor will be
negatively related to publicly expressing an opinion in both
the original and the MIM opinion climates (likelihood of
commenting on the Facebook post).
Because of the nature of the topic, there is a reason
to suspect that the frequency one follows political news
and uses social media may play an important role when
deciding whether to comment or not. Therefore, we added
the following hypotheses to our tests:
Hypothesis 2a: The frequency of following political news
will be a strong predictor of the utilization of different opinion
expression strategies on Facebook in both the original and
the MIM scenarios.
Hypothesis 2b: The frequency of use of social media will
be a strong predictor of the utilization of different opinion
expression strategies on Facebook in both the original and
the MIM scenarios.
Previous research on spiral-of-silence in social media
explored the effects of opinion strength such as attitude
certainty (i.e. the degree to which one feels about their own
opinion is correct [35]) and perceived issue importance (i.e.
how important is the freedom of speech on college campuses
to the general public [38]), we asked:
Research Question 2: How will attitude certainty influence
the utilization of different response strategies on Facebook
when discussing the freedom of political expression on college
campuses?
Research Question 3: How will the perception of issue
importance influence the utilization of different response
strategies on Facebook when discussing the freedom of
political expression on college campuses?
There is also a reason to suspect that the perceived opinion
climate of one’s friends and family and of the nation may
influence the willingness to express opinions, as found in
some instances [35]. These hypotheses tested these claims:
Hypothesis 3a: The perceived opinion climate among
friends and family will be strong predictors of the utilization
of different opinion expression strategies on Facebook when
discussing the freedom of political expression on college
campuses.
Hypothesis 3b: The perceived opinion climate of the nation
will be strong predictors of the utilization of different opinion
expression strategies on Facebook when discussing the free-
dom of political expression on college campuses.
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Fig. 3. The original Facebook post and comments.
V. RESULTS
Following an IRB approval, data were obtained through an
online survey (N = 311), fielded via Prolific, a crowd-sourced
participants pool [43]. Due to the choice of the topic of this
study we recruited participants in the age bracket between 18
and 34 that are either college students or have recently earned
a bachelor’s degree. The spiral-of-silence theory assumes that
the topic is of personal relevance for an individual to engage
with it, therefore the selection criteria required participants to
be mainly college-age [39]. Participants consisted of 55% cis-
female (N = 171), 42.1% cis-male (N = 131), 0.3% transgender
female (N = 1), 1.3% transgender male (N = 4), gender
variant/non-conforming 1.0% (N = 3), and 0.3% preferring
not to answer (N = 1). Participants were randomly assigned
to either the original or the MIM scenario and completed a
questionnaire. The questionnaire asked the participants about
their response to the Facebook post and comments, about so-
cial media use, following of political news, opinions, attitudes,
and the issue importance. Upon completion, participants were
debriefed and rewarded a small monetary prize.
Fig. 4. The MIM Facebook post and comments.
A. Predisposing Spiral-of-Silence Conditions on Facebook
Research Question 1 explored how a manipulated Facebook
post on the topic of freedom of political expression on college
campuses influences the choice of a response strategy. As
shown in Table 1 and 2, participants in the MIM scenario
are more likely to comment on the Facebook scenario and
post (p = 0.031) and more likely to tell someone else
about it offline (p = 0.038) compared to the participant
in the original scenario. The calculated effect size is < 0.3
(small). Participants didn’t show any difference on the other
two response strategies between the scenarios. As suspected,
the results demonstrate that the malware is capable of engi-
neering the spiral-of-silence effect on Facebook. This is an
important finding that confirms the existence of the spiral-
of-silence effect on a polarizing political issue on Facebook
for the younger-leaning participant sample in our study. By
inducing a misperception that the opinion climate is liberal-
leaning, the malware eliminated the fear of isolation from the
original, conservative-learning scenario, and encouraged the
participants to express their opinion, both online and offline.
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TABLE I
MATT-WHITNEY U TEST FOR THE TWO SCENARIOS AS A GROUPING
VARIABLE.
Comment Read, not Comment Ignore Tell Offline
U 10501 11892 10474 10914
Z 2.155 .259 1.411 2.072
Sig .031* .796 .158 .038*
*p < .05, **p < .01
TABLE II
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SIGNFICANT RESPONSES
STRATEGIES.
Comment Tell Offline
Scenario MIM Original MIM Original
Mean 2.42 2.08 3.88 3.95
Median 2 1 4.0 4.5
STD 1.732 1.64 1.810 1.857
This is an expected outcome in the context of political
discourse, i.e. the malware covertly created the necessary
conditions that allowed the participants in the MIM scenario to
succumb to the characteristic ’echo chamber’ effect [18]. See-
ing a favorite narrative in the MIM scenario reinforced the con-
firmation bias that helped to account for participants decisions
about whether to spread content both online and offline, as the
formative action that leads to towards preferential interaction
based on confirming claims in the Facebook comments section
of the post [44]. The preferential interactions, based on the
malware-induced misperception, initiate a feedback loop that
continuously amplifies ideologically orthodox comments and
posts and drowns out any opposing views, ultimately resulting
into the spiral-of-silence effect [40].
B. Socially Engineered Spiral-of-Silence on Facebook
Hypothesis 1 claimed that the willingness to self-censor, as a
composite measure, will be negatively related to the likelihood
to comment on the Facebook post in both scenarios. Based on
Table 3, the more participants were willing to self-censor, the
less likely they were to publicly comment on the Facebook
post (original condition β = −.228, p < .01; MIM condition
β = −.334, p < .01), confirming the prediction in Hypothesis
1. These results demonstrate the existence of the spiral-of-
silence effect on Facebook on the particular issue investigated
in our study in both the original and MIM scenario, proving
the capability of the malware to induce misperception of the
public opinion climate without raising suspicion. This is a
very important finding that demonstrates the capability of the
malware to socially engineer the spiral-of-silence effect on
social media, Facebook in particular. In addition, the results
also confirm the previous evidence that individuals with high
levels of willingness to self-censor use Facebook as a forum to
monitor public opinion on important social and political issues
when expressing their opinion offline [16], [30], [33].
TABLE III
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION PREDICTING THE LIKELIHOOD OF
COMMENTING ON THE FACEBOOK POST.
Original Std. MIM Std.
Demographics
Age .026 .001 .349 .036
Gender .208 .088 -.167 -.092
Incr. R2(%) 3.5 4.7
Social Media and Politics
Social Media Use .194 .097 -.042 -.016
Following Politics -2.45* -.169* -.276* -.190*
Incr. R2(%) 5.2** 5.9*
Focal Variables
Willingness to
self-censor -0.512** -.228** -.831** -.334**
Attitude certainty .036 .034 .001 .001
Issue importance -.241 -.131 .145 .072
Congruence
friends & family .002 .034 .002 .033
Congruence
nation .000 .004 .004 .048
Incr. R2(%) 6.8* 11.3*
Total R(%) 15** 21.9**
*p < .05, **p < .01
Hypothesis 2a claimed that the frequency with which one
follows political news will be strong predictors of the utiliza-
tion of different opinion expression strategies. The frequency
of following political news was measured by asking, ”How
closely do you follow political news” (1 = Never to 5 =
Always; M = 2.85, SD = 1.155). Based on Tables 3-6, the
more frequently one follows political news:
• the less likely is to comment on the Facebook post in
both scenarios (original scenario β = −.169 p < .05;
MIM scenario β = −.190, p < .05)
• the less likely to read but not comment on the Facebook
post in both scenarios (original scenario β = −.277 p <
.01; MIM scenario β = −.194, p < .01)
• the more likely to ignore the Facebook post in both
scenarios (original scenario β = −.390 p < .01; MIM
scenario β = −.353, p < .01)
• the more likely to tell someone about the Facebook post
in the original scenario (β = .142 p < .01)
These results shed further light into the capabilities of the
malware and the possibility of profiling future MIM targets.
The stronger negative relationship between the frequency of
following political news and and the first response strategy
(Table 3) in the MIM scenario compared to the weaker
relationships for the other response strategies (Table 4-6)
indicates that the primary targets for the MIM attacks should
be the individuals that are interested in the daily politics but
remain largely ”undecided.” This is a well known fact that is
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used in political campaigning well before social media became
a factor in inducing voter bias [6]. The results also indicate
that the MIM attack is not simply an alternative to trolling,
but it is a much more powerful tool for influencing outcomes.
The social media trolls usually target individuals that follow
political news with high frequency; MIM on the other hand,
allows for targeting the individuals without a particular pattern
of daily check-ups for the public opinion climate.
Hypothesis 2b claimed that the frequency with which one
uses social media will be strong predictors of the utilization
of different opinion expression strategies. The frequency of
using social media was measured by asking, ”How often do
you use social media” (1 = Never to 5 = Several Times a
Day; M = 4.53, SD = 0.74). Based on Tables 3-6, the more
frequently one uses social media:
• the more likely to read but not comment on the Facebook
post only in the original scenario (β = .352 p < .01)
• the less likely to ignore the Facebook post only in the
original scenario (β = .142 p < .01)
The frequency of social media use proved not to be a deci-
sive predictor in speaking up or silencing in the MIM scenario.
The same can be concluded for the original scenario given
that significance is achieved only for the response strategies
that ignore or simply read the post and comments. Seeing
this result from a profile perceptive, as discussed before, the
MIM attackers need not to worry about how frequently one
uses social media, but for what purpose. This uncovers another
utility of the MIM attack - it can be used, in a same fashion
as trolling, if the attackers choose to alter the factual integrity
of the Facebook content and post and make it look more
provoking or sound inflammatory to the target users.
The versatility of the MIM attack is further corroborated
with the results of the tests of Hypothesis 3a and 3b show in
in Table 3-6. The claims that the perceived opinion climate
among friends and family and among the nation, respectively,
will be strong predictors of the utilization of different opinion
expression strategies were unsupported in our particular case.
Similarly, we haven’t found evidence that the attitude certainty
(Research Question 2) and the perceived issues importance
(Research Question 3) influence the utilization of the response
strategies. Seeing this result from a profile perceptive, the MIM
attackers need not to worry about what the target users talks
with their friends and family or whether the user believes
the issue is important to the general public. Looking back to
the findings from Research Question 1, these results confirm
that the MIM attack is only concerned about the search
for confirming claims in the Facebook comments section of
the post (the ’echo chamber’ effect). This means that it is
sufficient for the malware to induce misperceptions about
the ”majority” opinion climate without considering any other
factors in order to socially engineer the spiral-of-silence effect
on social media. The overall findings make a compelling case
for a resourceful actor, interested in alternative to trolling,
to invest into developing and disseminating a misperception-
inducing malware.
TABLE IV
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION PREDICTING THE LIKELIHOOD OF READING
BUT NOT COMMENTING THE FACEBOOK POST.
Original Std. MIM Std.
Demographics
Age 2.137 .104 1.99 .210
Gender -.299 -.122 .095 .053
Incr. R2(%) 0.1 0.7
Social Media and Politics
Social Media Use .677** .352** .291 .11
Following Politics -.388** -.277** -.286* -.194*
Incr. R2(%) 21.0** 5.9*
Focal Variables
Willingness to
self-censor -012 -005 .178 .070
Attitude certainty .134 .128 .018 .015
Issue importance -.108 -.061 .239 .117
Congruence
friends & family .010 .162 .000 -.004
Congruence
nation -.007 -098 -.001 -.008
Incr. R2(%) 2.5 1.9
Total R(%) 23.6 8.5
*p < .05, **p < .01
VI. DISCUSSION
This study, to our knowledge, is the first one to test the
possibility of socially engineering or disrupting the spiral-
of-silence on social media by employing a malware-induced
misperception in a polarized discourse on Facebook. Previous
studies exploring the spiral-of-silence effect assumed that
individuals’ perception of the public opinion is based on media
information from authentic and credible sources. In our study,
we used a malware to induce misperception by manipulating
the linguistic formatting of authentic social media information,
a post and comments discussing a polarizing political issue.
The Cambridge Analytica scandal and the alleged Russian
meddling with the 2016 elections provided an additional
impetus for the test in order to scope the potential strategies
for political influence before the election year 2020.
Our initial tests demonstrate that a malware could suc-
cessfully induce a misperception about the public opinion
climate gauged from the people’s interaction on social media.
In our study, this malware covertly manipulated words in the
conservative-leaning comments section of a Facebook post to
make them appear liberal-leaning, and with that, created a
the perception for our liberal-leaning sample that the opinion
climate is preferential to them. Seeing a favorite narrative,
participants took a formative action towards sharing their
opinion both online and offline. Our further analysis demon-
strated that the misperception induced by the malware was
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TABLE V
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION PREDICTING THE LIKELIHOOD OF
IGNORING THE FACEBOOK POST.
Original Std. MIM Std.
Demographics
Age -1.05 -.005 .034 .003
Gender -.025 -.009 .242 .127
Incr. R2(%) 0.3 0.9
Social Media and Politics
Social Media Use -.474** -.214** -.114 -0.41
Following Politics .663** .390** .546** .353**
Incr. R2(%) 19.2** 12.4**
Focal Variables
Willingness to
self-censor -.012 -.005 .330 .125
Attitude certainty .194 .161 -.068 -.056
Issue importance -.122 -.059 .208 .097
Congruence
friends & family -.003 -.041 .002 .037
Congruence
nation -.002 -.024 -.004 -.043
Incr. R2(%) 2.4 2.8
Total R(%) 29.1 16.1
*p < .05, **p < .01
sufficient to socially engineer the spiral-of-silence effect. The
preferential interactions of most participants were to talk about
the Facebook post offline instead of online, which initiate a
feedback loop that continuously amplifies ideologically liberal
comments and posts and drowns out any opposing views,
ultimately resulting into the spiral-of-silence effect.
In other words, the malware preliminary disrupted the
predisposing spiral-of-silence conditions to nudge participants
to succumb to the ’echo chamber’ effect, and with that, avoid
to share their opinion publicly online. The findings of the study
supports the claim that ”engaging in opinion expression to
someone offline removes the inherent risks associated with ex-
pressing opinions in a public online forum composed of people
one knows in real life” [16] ,[33]. This is an important notion
from a political influence perspective because it confirms the
findings that ”social media users, despite being reluctant to
publicly comment on the post, are actively engaged in this
environment through observation” [16], [30].
The MIM attack works in a highly targeted fashion and has
a reduced reach compared to other forms of online influence
like trolling. Target profiling, then, is more important to a
MIM attacker and we also conducted an analysis to see the
profile of targets that will mostly fall victim to a MIM attack.
Our analysis suggests that the most likely victims to the MIM
attacks are the people who follow political news, but remain
generally undecided on most polarizing issues on social media.
Demographic aspects like age, gender, and social media use
TABLE VI
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION PREDICTING THE LIKELIHOOD OF TELLING
SOMEONE ELSE OFFLINE ABOUT THE FACEBOOK POST.
Original Std. MIM Std.
Demographics
Age 2.607 .112 -.446 -.043
Gender -.092 -0.33 -.161 -.043
Incr. R2(%) 1.9 0.5
Social Media and Politics
Social Media Use .254 .112 .026 .009
Following Politics -.412** .142** -.273 -.171
Incr. R2(%) 9.2** 3.3
Focal Variables
Willingness to
self-censor .279 .110 .126 .046
Attitude certainty -.066 -.054 .113 .090
Issue importance .230 .110 .107 .048
Congruence
friends & family -.004 -.062 -.006 -.092
Congruence
nation .013 .167 -0.004 -.040
Incr. R2(%) 3.4 2.1
Total R(%) 14.4 5.9
*p < .05, **p < .01
have shown in our analysis to be irrelevant factors. It also
doesn’t matter for MIM attackers if a target user’s opinion
is congruent with the public opinion. Victims to the MIM
attack can also be anyone regardless of their attitude certainty
or perceived issue importance on the particular polarizing
discourse and issue of freedom of speech on college campuses.
A. Implications
The malware, as demonstrated, has the potential to ”nudge”
a target user to focus on the opinion climate rather than
assessing whether a Facebook post and comments are intended
as trolling or rumors. The MIM attack vector, in other words,
is not aimed at the social media platform but rather at a user
or group of users of interest. This eliminates the constraint
that the platform administrators will remove suspicious content
and places the burden of defense on the user side. The MIM
can be used to ”socially engineer” a targeted user to break
out from the spiral-of-silence and express their opinion on a
topic that, under normal conditions, they would choose not to
say offline. The alternative outcome is also possible: silencing
users on topics upon which they would usually choose to
express on social media. For posts with public comments,
the MIM attack can work with minimal to no adaptation for
more than one political topic (e.g. foreign policy, immigration,
tariffs, and reproductive health). This allows the malicious
actors to dynamically re-purpose the attack depending on the
trending political discourse on the social media platforms.
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The ethical implications of our MIM study are the same
as those related to publishing any vulnerability: the value of
publicly sharing a proof-of-concept social engineering attack
with knowledgeable researchers outweighs the opportunity that
potential attackers may benefit from the publication. If this
paper introduces a viable attack in the social media ecosystem–
which it might will–due to its simplistic nature, we believe
that this might be merely a confirmation of similar attacks,
independently developed and deployed by well-resourced ad-
versaries or nation-state groups. The study itself tests the
plausibility of a locally developed MIM browser extension
(not publicly available on the Chrome store). In the context of
a real-life MIM attack, a responsible disclosure would entail
contacting Google, the developers of Chrome, and working
with them through the details of the malware extension.
B. Limitations
Though the results of this study suggest that the MIM attack
is capable of socially engineering or disrupting the spiral-of-
silence within social media on a polarizing political issue, cau-
tion is warranted when interpreting them. The use of controlled
Facebook post allowed us to capture the first impressions of
the participants, but this choice at the same time limits the
generalization of the findings in regards to the real opinion
expression behavior. The polarizing topic chosen in this study
might have been of variable degree of interest to individual
participants, which also affects their decision to express their
opinion. We tried to control for this by selecting a younger,
college-age population assuming that the issue of freedom of
political expression is highly relevant for them and they can
identify with it. This on the other side, limits the generalization
of the findings about an older population that has a more
distant outlook on this issue considering other factors such
the general political climate or their attitude certainty. Same
holds for the self-reported frequency of following political
news, which may be influenced by the type of news, outlets,
topics, and interfaces. We anonymized the comments in both
scenarios and didn’t explicitly ask whether participants will
express their opinion if anonymity is granted. Anonymity is
an integral part of the social media ecosystem and further
research should test the MIM potential of socially engineering
a spiral-of-silence process under conditions of anonymity.
Our results are also limited particular choice of web browser
as an interface and a particular social media site - Facebook.
The malware was tested in its extension variant but there are
many people that access social media through smartphone
applications or multiple interfaces in the same time. There is a
possibility that the same results might not be obtained because
smartphone applications provide a different set of interaction
affordances that limit the cues one uses to access the opinion
climate. Similarly, using multiple interfaces contributes to
repetitive exposure to the same information which can lead to
changes in perceptions about the issue importance and one’s
attitude certainty. This, in turn, can make people more or less
compelled to comment on a polarizing issue regardless of their
political ideology or gender identity. The particular choice
of social media site also limits the generalization because
other social media platforms have different affordances that
influence one’s opinion formation and decision to speak out.
For example, Twitter has limited text input, Instagram is heavy
on non-textual content (e.g. images, videos, gifs), while Reddit
has SubReddits, up or down-voting, and the act of giving
gold. Because these affordances shape norms of what people
share and expect to see being shared, different platforms could
have a variable degree of conductivity to a socially engineered
spiral-of-silence effect.
The sample in the study was liberal-leaning and the findings
might be different for a representative sample. We didn’t
control for any other dimensions of one’s political identity,
which certainly factor in one’s willingness to self-censor.
For example, individuals’ partisanship, structure, culture, and
historical experience of society often shape the preconceptions
of a polarizing issue at stake, even in circumstances where
the people put a premium on purportedly independent and
objective public opinion assessment [52]. On this token, MIM
is a novel attack and users are unaware of its existence to
be able to detect it in the first place, regardless of any prior
phishing training or negative experience with trolling and
propaganda on social media. The outcomes of the study may
be different if user awareness about this attack is raised, as it
is usually the case with social engineering attacks. Although
we demonstrated the potential of the MIM attack, it might be
hard to scale it up quickly to a large social media population
like the trolling, rumor, or disinformation campaigns do, but
that is what makes the MIM attack compelling to a malicious
actor.
C. MIM Defenses and Prevention
The study introduces a plausible social engineering vector
against individuals and groups that has yet to emerge in the
wild, but has analogs in other deception and information
warfare contexts [10]. The threat of MIM is an inherent risk
of computer-mediated communication, particularly as artificial
intelligence and machine learning enable software to parse
and edit text toward particular opinion climate, emotional
tone, or adversarial perspective. The first line of defense
would require elimination of any suspicious extensions in the
Chrome store that require permissions to control how HTML
text is presented to a user. An example defense, along the
lines of malicious software detection, would be using trusted
browsers to detect JavaScript executions that are rearranging
words and sentences in the textual portion of an HTML
document [28]. Another example is Chrome’s Manifest v3
API, which is designed to eliminate extensions exhibiting
suspicious behaviour in content manipulation [19]. Content-
level signing might not help in these regards because the MIM
manipulation happens after the content integrity check in the
sequence of HTML reception and display.
One thing to have in mind is the possibility of the sneaking
the malware extension on the Chrome store as an ”accessibility
(a11y) extension” by claiming that the rewording is done
to create an assistive natural language software that, for
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example, helps non-native English speakers [26]. It might
be harder to bar an extension from the Chrome store on
these grounds, therefore, the certification process must request
all the use cases for these word manipulations upfront to
ensure no misperception-inducing logic is hidden in the inner
workings of the assistive extension. Even with these cautions,
a malicious actor may find a way to deploy the malware on a
target’s browser (for example, an insider threat).
As with any social engineering tactic, awareness of the
potential attack is an advantage to the defender and a second
line of defense. Given that the attack takes place on the target’s
browser and not the social media platforms, this might be the
only available option for individuals at this point. A practical
training session for detecting MIM attacks revolves around the
idea of crossing the deception judgment threshold, as argued
by the Truth-Default theory and scrutinizing the Facebook post
and comments [31]. The traditional social engineering training
is focused on quick visual assessments for the most reliable
indicators like URLs, grammar, padlocks for https, links, and
attachments. This is already in place for the MIM attack. The
focus for the MIM training is thus on the analysis of the social
media posts and comments in the broader context of the issue
at stake (in our case, freedom of speech on college campuses).
The deception judgment can be calibrated based on updated
facts for both the perceived majority and minority opinions.
Compared to the traditional social engineering victims, the
MIM victims have the advantage of individually approaching
each of the people that commented on the post and verifying
their original opinion. Or, verifying the authenticity of the
comments and the prevailing public opinion by checking
other media sources reporting on a given polarizing issue.
Certainly, this out-of-band verification might make the social
media interaction cumbersome, but that is a very small cost
to quickly cross the deception judgment threshold. We believe
this is an empowering strategy, and suggest that any social
engineering training has a section on MIM as a tactic for
inducing misperception on social media.
D. Future Work
For our next research steps we plan to replicate and extend
the current study with other social media sites (e.g. Twitter,
Reddit) to explore whether the affordances of a particular
social media side affects the choice of a response strategy. Our
plan is also to cover other controversial topics popular or social
media, for example vaccination, conspiracy theories or global
warming that to not necessarily divide the people on political
ideology or gender identity lines. We will work on diversifying
our future samples and control for age, level of education,
or other demographic and cultural factors so as to get a
more nuanced idea on how a spiral-of-silence effect, socially
engineered or disrupted by a covert malware, might unfold
in the future for a purpose of a covert, low-intensity political
propaganda. Towards a more robust test of the malware, the
future research will investigate whether a different packaging,
e.g. a third-party smartphone social media application, could
amplify or attenuate the misperception-inducing potential of
the malware. Another line of research will continue to explore
machine learning mechanism for automated decision making
on what type of linguistic rearrangement is the best suited
for a particular polarizing issue, target, or a social media
platform. Our objective in future research is not to perpetuate
any deviant cybersecurity behaviour, quite the contrary. We
are strongly dedicated to investigating any facet of the MIM
attack to be able to eradicate it with both technological and
societal prevention mechanisms.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduced the MIM attack as a means
of covert opinion manipulation of political discourse on Face-
book. We tested it with 311 participants and showed that the
MIM attack has the potential to socially engineer the spiral-
of-silence effect on social media. The results also show that
the MIM attack has the potential to disrupt the spiral-of-
silence by creating misperceptions about the public opinion
climate and nudging people to succumb to the echo chamber
effect. Our main contribution is the evidence that the spiral-of-
silence effect can be induced on demand - only with a piece
of seemingly benign JavaScript (or other software) code and
without fabricating any social media content. We hope our
results inform the security community about the implications
of having an alternative social engineering vector for social
media influence, at least in a micro-targeted variant. We are
aware that malware and the attack have a long way to go before
materialize into a sizable threat. Nevertheless, the early proof-
of-concept demonstrated in this paper facilitates a critical,
scientific outlook on the use covert malware in situations
where social interaction is a decision making factor.
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